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Drafting Chapter 2 of the ALI's Employment Law Restatement in the Shadow of
Contract Law: An Assessment of the Challenges and Results
Robert A. Hillman
The American Law Institute (ALI) has just completed the Restatement of the Law Third,
Employment Law.1 Chapter 2 is entitled "Employment Contracts: Termination." As the name
suggests, the Chapter focuses on the law's difficult challenge of applying contract law to
distinguish lawful terminations of employees from wrongful ones. The question is especially
problematic because, on the one hand, employment law's long-existing default rule allows
employers to terminate employees “at will” and without cause. Advocates of the at-will doctrine
present several policies to support it, including freedom of contract and efficiency.2 On the other
hand, employers seek to attract talented employees and, once employed, establish an “orderly,
cooperative and loyal work force.”3 Toward that end, numerous judicial decisions and scholarly
research reveal unsurprisingly that employers design their communications to attract employees
and create loyal workers.4 Further, as I have stated elsewhere, some communications
induce employees to change jobs, forgo job searches, accept job conditions, or otherwise
change position. In the context of a plentiful labor supply, high costs of employee
relocation, and material and psychic investments by employees in their jobs, non-union
employees often lack the bargaining power, resources, information, and wherewithal to
withstand employer inducements.5
It is no wonder, then, that contract law's approach to indefinite-duration employment issues
includes decisions policing employer overreaching and thereby creating rules that limit
employment at will.6
Given this clash of policies, the primary challenge for the reporters of the new
employment restatement in Chapter 2 was to search the cases and identify the circumstances in
which terminated employees should be entitled to legal protection, no easy task given the
multitudinous and amorphous case law on employment discharge, the dynamic labor market
atmosphere and, perhaps most important, contract law's lack of a unifying theory of its own.7

1

The Restatement is denominated "Third," which is bound to cause some confusion because its preamble
proclaims that it is the first ever Restatement of employment law.
2

See infra notes , and accompanying text. See also Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of
Promissory Estoppel in the Employment Setting, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1999) (hereinafter
"Unfulfilled Promise") (discussing arguments in favor and opposed).
3
Touissaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
4
Hillman, "Unfulfilled Promise," supra note , at 4.
5
Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
6
I refer to principles favorable to employees in indefinite duration contracts as counter-rules not
exceptions to reflect the ambivalence on whether at-will or the counter-principles form the central core of
employment contract termination.
7
Stewart Schwab sees some coherence in termination law:
1
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Related to this challenge, the ALI's conception of a restatement seemingly allows reporters to
venture beyond describing the law (but cautiously).8 The reporters therefore had to decide what
constitutes the appropriate mix of description and prescription in their efforts to assess the
contradiction in employment policies.
This essay focuses on Chapter 2's treatment of employment at will, on the one hand, and
promissory estoppel and good faith, on the other, as examples of how Chapter 2 meets these
challenges. The essay concludes that Chapter 2 establishes a useful framework and helpfully
identifies the issues for the courts. Because promissory estoppel and good faith (and other
contract doctrines) are themselves indistinct, however, Chapter 2 often cannot resolve the
principle and counter-principle dilemma in particular cases and therefore cannot fully satisfy
ALI's goal of clarifying and modernizing the law through restatements. For the same reason, I
doubt that a project in the form of a restatement will be particularly helpful in enhancing
employee protection if the playing field is uneven.
Part I of this paper focuses on Chapter 2's treatment of employment at will, promissory
estoppel, and good faith. Part II evaluates the approaches and argues that the Chapter establishes
a helpful framework. Part II also asserts that the Chapter leaves much for case law development,
which is inevitable when drafting in the shadow of contract law. Part III ruminates on what a
Principles of Employment Law: Termination could have looked like, freed from the strictures of
a restatement.
I. An Overview of "Employment Contracts: Termination"
Section 2.01 of Chapter 2 of the Restatement presents the at-will principle and
inventories the counter-rules treated in subsequent sections of the Chapter. I focus on Sections
2.01 (at-will default rule), 2.02(b) (promissory estoppel), and 2.07 (implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing). The issues I identify are not unique to these sections, but instead illustrate the
challenges of restating employment termination law in the shadow of general contract law.
A. Section 2.01: Default Rule of an At-Will Employment Relationship

The life-cycle framework that courts have developed provides the parties in a career employment
relationship a legal structure that checks opportunistic behavior. Its fundamental premise is that
both employer and employees can act opportunistically. Consequently, a life-cycle analysis does
not categorically condemn or celebrate employment at will. It supports, in broad outline, the
contract law inroads that have been made on the at-will doctrine, particularly at the beginning and
the end of an employee's career, and it explains the continued vitality of the at-will rule for midcareer employees. The current position of the courts is superior to a dogmatic insistence on the
old at-will regime, which creates an excessive risk of opportunistic terminations for long-term,
and sometimes beginning-career workers. Moreover, the current hesitant, intermediate position
may also be superior to a general just-cause standard, which would lead to excessive shirking by
midcareer workers.
Stewart Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 8 (1993).
8

See infra notes , and accompanying text.
2
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Section 2.01 affirms the employment-at-will principle, but also references the counterrules:
Either Party may terminate an employment relationship with or without cause unless the
right to do so is limited by a statute, other law or public policy, or a 2.02 agreement,
binding employer promise, or binding employer statement.
Comment b conceptualizes the employment relationship as contractual, meaning that contract
law's set of default rules apply unless displaced by the parties' agreement or other law.9
Comment b and the Reporters' Notes point out that 49 states include some form of the
employment-at-will default rule. Comments c through e reference the series of counter-rules
listed in Section 2.01's boilerplate. Section 2.01 thus sets up the chasm between rule and
counter-rule that the drafters address in the rest of the Chapter.
Advocates of both the at-will rule and the counter-rules pronounce strong policy reasons
in support of their positions.10 In brief, theorists in favor of the at-will rule cite freedom of
contract and assert that the rule reflects the parties understanding of their relationship.11 In
addition, the rule arguably is efficient because "'in the face of uncertain changes in technology
and business, [the rule] allows parties to exit precisely'" when the gains from doing so exceed the
gains from continuing the employment.12 Further, based on their observation of relatively few
for-cause employment contracts and their surmise that employees receive higher pay for at-will
arrangements, proponents assert that the parties seek such agreements.13 In addition, the threat of
termination without cause arguably creates incentives in employees not to shirk or otherwise
misbehave.14 Finally, courts may apply employment at will most often to mid-term employees,
precisely when employee shirking is most prominent.15
On the other hand, supporters of the counter-rules refer to the adverse consequences of
the at-will principle because of employees' financial dependence and lack of mobility.16 In
addition, contrary to the proponents of at-will employment, supporters of the counter-rules claim
that employees expect only for-cause termination and worry about inappropriate employer

9

For a discussion of employment agreements as contracts, see infra notes , and accompanying text.

10

Some of these arguments are found in Comment a to Section 2.01.

11

Reporters' Notes, Comment a; see also id. citing Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984) and Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics and Bad Policy: Time to
Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1901 (1996) (employers have a property right in at-will
employment)

12

Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note , at 26, quoting Sherwin Roswen, Commentary: In Defense
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 983, 983 (1984).
13
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note .
14
Id.
15
Schwab, supra note .
16
See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. Rev.
1, 9 (2010).
3

motives for terminating them.17 Employees also may reasonably rely on employer
communications that suggest for-cause employment, as the next subsection suggests.18
B. Section 2.02: Agreements and Binding Employer Promises or Statements Providing for Terms
Other Than At-Will Employment
Section 2.02 provides in (a) that employment is not terminable at will if the parties have
an agreement otherwise. Subsections (c) through (e) refer to employer policy statements, good
faith, and "other established principles" as also limiting employment at will. Section 2.02(b), the
focus here, states that "[t]he employment relationship is not terminable at will by an employer if
* * * a promise by the employer to limit termination of employment reasonably induces
detrimental reliance by the employee (2.02, Comment c)."
Section 2.02(b) and its reference to Comment c invoke the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 90 supplies the promissory estoppel rule
that courts almost uniformly apply. It reads:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice ca be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.19
Initially promissory estoppel supplied a remedy for a promisee's reasonable but uncompensated
reliance on a gift promise.20 Courts expanded the doctrine to enforce promises in contracts that
were unenforceable for reasons such as indefiniteness or the lack of a writing,21 and courts now
even apply it at the negotiating stage.22 Despite this expansion and although analysts surmised
that promissory estoppel would dominate in the courts, it has not been very successful overall.23
Part of the reason is that enforcing promises outside of the traditional theory of bargained-for
exchange is controversial.24 It is therefore not surprising that employees face formidable hurdles
when bringing promissory estoppel claims. The following discussion considers and adds to the
employment Restatement's treatment of promissory estoppel and inventories the significant
hurdles employees face in bringing such a claim.
1. Was there a promise?

17

Id. at 10.
Reporters' Notes, Comment a. But a just-cause rule may not sufficiently protect employees who may
be unable to prove employer arbitrariness. See Arnow-Richman, supra note , at 17-21; infra notes , and
accompanying text.
19
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90 (1979).
20
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 71 (1979).
21
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note , at 3-4, citing Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson,
Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903, 907
(1985).
22
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
18

23

Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the 'New Consensus' on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical
and Theoretical Study, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 580 (1998).
24
See, e.g., William C. Whitford and Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, The Rest
of the Story, 61 Hastings L. J. 801 (2010).
4

A promise consists of "an assurance, in whatever form of expression given, that a thing
will or will not be done. * * * [A promise is] meant to give an assurance as to a future event."25
Courts must distinguish general statements such as compliments about work quality or positive
statements about an employee's career from definite assurances of job security.26 Comment c to
Section 2.02 specifically refers to this challenge: "The promise * * * must be sufficiently definite
to reasonably induce the action taken in reliance on the promise." Nevertheless, some courts find
that an implied promise is enough. For example, one court found that an employer's listing of
sanctions if an employee interviewed elsewhere meant that the employer "promised" not to
increase the sanctions beyond those listed.27 Another employer told its employee that "she did
not need to look for another job" and the court found that statement actionable.28
The majority of courts, however, seem too willing to grant summary judgment against the
employee on the question of whether the employer made a definite promise. Statements such as
"your job is secure," "there is no need * * * to look elsewhere,"29 "[you] will continue to have a
career with [the employer] until age sixty-five,"30 and [you will] remain employed by the
company"31 should be sufficient for an employee to defeat summary judgment on the issue of
whether the employer made a definite promise, but the courts considering these statements did
not agree.32
In addition, some courts too easily find on a motion for summary judgment that any
promise made was too ambiguous to enforce. These courts look for unnecessary detail that the
law should require only for enforcing a contract, such as a specific duration or compensation.33
Comment c to Section 2.02 appears to dismiss the need for such specificity at least in the case of
an oral agreement: "Where the conditions for promissory estoppel are present, promises may be
enforceable even though an agreement itself would not be enforceable for lack of a written
document."
2. Did the employee rely on the promise?
A prominent issue is whether the employer made the promise concerning job terms or
retirement benefits before or after the employee agreed to the employment or decided to retire.34
If the agreement or retirement came first, of course, the employee cannot show that the promise
induced the reliance, a requirement made explicit in Comment c to section 2.02. In addition, I
have previously written that
25

Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn. 1960).
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 12.
27
Board v. Simmons Industries, Inc., 1994 WL 454738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
28
Howard v. Kuehnert, 1996 WL 145517 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
29
Corradi v. Soclof, 1995 WL 322311 (Ct. App. Ohio), discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra
note , at 13.
30
Dickens v. Equifax Services, Inc., 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. 1996), discussed in Hillman, Unfulfilled
Promise, supra note , at 14.
31
Id. The court stated that the supervisor's statements "were not sufficiently definite to be legally
enforceable promises for purposes of establishing promissory estoppel." Id. at *6.
32
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note , at 12-15.
33
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 15; see, e.g., Schoeneck v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball
Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
34
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 15
26

5

[a]s a general matter, courts required employees to allege and establish more than that
they accepted or continued a job or failed to look for a substitute job. Employees had to
show that they rejected other distinct offers or opportunities. Courts ignored the fact that
failing to enter the job market itself could constitute a distinct detriment that would
severely undermine an employee's ultimate prospect for career success.35
Illustrations 1 and 2 to Comment c follow the decisions that require employees to demonstrate
that they turned down a distinct offer.
3. Was the reliance reasonable?
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 90 focuses on whether "the
promisor should reasonably expect [the promise] to induce action or forbearance," most courts
focus on the promisee and ask whether the promisee's reliance was reasonable.36 This is not a
serious divergence from Section 90 because a promisor should reasonably have expected the
promisee to rely when the promisee's reliance was reasonable. At any rate, demonstrating the
reasonableness of the employee's reliance may be the employee's most difficult hurdle. Courts
justifiably are troubled by the reasonableness of reliance if the parties have not yet nailed down a
contract or an existing contract contradicts promises or representation made less formally.37
Courts have found that employees who receive inconsistent messages about their
employment cannot reasonably rely on the favorable one.38 This, of course, disfavors employees
if an employer makes promises to induce the employee to agree to employment only to disclaim
the promised benefits in a subsequent written contract.39 Courts have also held against employees
in the opposite situation where the employee signs a written at-will agreement or even just
receives notice of such, but then relies on a later contradictory communication promising job
security.40 In addition, courts find reliance unreasonable if the employer's communication was
vague or ambiguous.41
4. Was the reliance unforeseeable?
If an alleged employer's promise was indistinct or uncertain, it is an easy step for courts
to find any employee reliance unforeseeable. For example, in one case, an employee relied on the
employer's failure to give the employee a scheduled job appraisal as indicating that his job was

35
36

37

Id. at 16.
Robert A. Hillman, Principles of Contract Law 97 (2014).

See generally Whitford and Macaulay, supra note .

38

See, e.g., Coll v. PB Diagnostic, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995), discussed in Hillman,
Unfulfilled Promise, supra note , at 16-17.
39
See, e.g., Coll v. PB Diagnostic, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995).
40
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 17.
41
See, e.g., Coll v. PB Diagnostic, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995), discussed in Hillman,
Unfulfilled Promise, supra note , at 17.
6

secure. The court found that the employer “had no reason to expect” the employee to rely on this
omission.42
5. Other reasons
Employees face additional hurdles to proving promissory estoppel. I have summed these
up elsewhere:
Courts dismissed employee promissory estoppel claims for an assortment of additional
reasons. These included the speculative nature of the damages, the lack of injustice
because the employee did not have sufficient education for the position promised, the
statute of frauds, and the preemption by ERISA. In addition, claimants faced long odds
when the employer was a public agency: “[C]ourts have consistently refused to give
effect to government fostered expectations that, had they arisen in the private sector,
might well have formed the basis for a contract or an estoppel.”43
This brief assessment of promissory estoppel in the employment context shows that the
employment Restatement's recognition of the theory does not do very much to clarify the
doctrine in the employment termination context. In addition, employees will continue to have an
uphill battle attempting to prevail on the theory. But, in the tradition of an ALI Restatement,
Section 2.02(b) contributes by affirming promissory estoppel's availability in the at-will
termination setting despite some jurisdictions that do not recognize or narrow its use.44
C. Section 2.07 Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Under Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, every contract includes an
obligation of good faith. According to Section 2.07 of the employment Restatement,
employment contracts are no exception, notwithstanding the Section's recognition of the conflict
among jurisdictions on whether a good faith obligation exists in employment-at-will
circumstances.45 Undaunted, Section 2.07 provides that each party to an employment contract
owes the other "a non-waivable duty of good faith and fair dealing." 46
What is the nature of the good faith obligation adopted by the employment Restatement?
Although the obligation of good faith has many roles in contract law, including good faith
purchase and good faith modification, good faith performance is the subject of Section 2.07.
Good faith performance has a long history and writers have spilled lots of ink explaining it.47
Briefly, good faith performance "excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or

42

See Dunn v. NPM Healthcae Prods;, Inc., 1994 WL 468281 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994), discussed in
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 18.
43
Hillman, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note at 19.
44

See Section 2.02, Reporter's Notes Comment c.

45

Section 2.07, Reporters' Notes, Comment a.
46
Section 2.07(a).
47
For one treatment of its history, see Mathew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 Emp. Rts. & Emp.
Pol'y 93, 135 (2009).
7

reasonableness." 48 Courts identify such violations through the process of contract interpretation
and gap filling.49 A court can interpret the content of a contract to include an implied good-faith
obligation consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations.50 In so doing, the court may draw
on its view of what "decency, fairness or reasonableness" requires,51 based on the theory that the
parties must have intended to include such principles in their agreement: "Intention not otherwise
revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable."52
Alternatively a court can simply conclude that good faith is a mandatory term that imports the
community's view of decency and fairness regardless of expectations.53 Typically, a party is in
bad faith, however, only if its motive in performing the contract is to deprive the other party of
what it reasonably expected or community standards require.54
Section 2.07(a) of the employment Restatement expressly identifies two kinds of "nonwaivable" bad faith. The section provides that the good-faith obligation "includes an agreement
by each" party not to hinder the other party's performance or to deprive that party of the benefit
of the contract. This language suggests that the employment Restatement's good-faith obligation
is mandatory gap filler and does not require a reasonable expectations inquiry, although in
actuality each path would most often lead to the same result.55 Section 2.07(a) does not bar other
instances of bad faith, although depriving the other party of the benefits of the contract goes a
long way towards remedying much of the employer excesses identified in the cases.
Section 2.07(b) seeks to situate the good-faith obligation within the context of
employment at will. Here things get dicey. Subsection (b) emphasizes that the at-will default rule
applies notwithstanding "non-waivable" good faith: good faith "cannot be used to require cause
for termination in an employment agreement otherwise terminable at will." Does this suggest
that good faith is waivable after all if the parties agree to an at-will arrangement? The challenge
for the drafters, of course, was to harmonize these seemingly contradictory principles. Perhaps
this is not impossible, at least if examined through the lens of the reasonable expectations
approach to good faith. As one court said, "[t]hese two concepts can coexist if careful attention
is paid to the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties to a contract of employment atwill."56 But what are the parties' reasonable expectations in at-will cases? More specifically,

48

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 205, cmt. a.
"[T]he source of good faith lies on the border between contract interpretation and gap filling." Robert
A. Hillman, Principles of Contract Law 300 (3d ed. 2014).
50
According to Judge Richard Posner, good faith performance "is a stab at approximating the terms the
parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute."
Market St. Assocs., Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
51
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 205, cmt. a.
52
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
53
See infra notes , and accompanying text.
54
See, e.g., Steven Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1980).
49

55

See supra note , and accompanying text.

56

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 448 (Del. 1996).
8

when is an employer in bad faith for terminating an employee notwithstanding the employer's

right to terminate without cause?57
Section 2.07(c) attempts to answer this question. Drawing on employment cases that
have found bad faith, subsection (c) reveals two mandatory exceptions. Under (c)(1), an
employer is in bad faith if it "terminates or seeks to terminate" an employee in order to prevent
the employee from realizing rights or benefits that the employee would otherwise receive under
the employment contract. An employer is also in bad faith under subsection (c)(2) if its motive
for terminating an employee is to retaliate against the employee for lawful conduct under the
employment contract or other law. The Restatement therefore ultimately finds limitations on the
employer's right to terminate without cause--an employer is in bad faith if motivated by the
desire to deprive the employee of its benefits or to retaliate.
Illustration 1 to Section 2.07 reveals the employment Restatement's approach in Section
2.07(c)(1). Based on Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,58 the illustration posits that an
employer fires its sales employee, who had executed a sale of equipment, without cause. The
result of the termination was that the employee lost 25 percent of a commission that would have
been due according to the express contract if the employee had remained employed when the
employer delivered the equipment and 30 days had elapsed without a customer complaint. The
Illustration concludes that the employee "has an action against" the employer for the commission
lost as a result of the termination. But the employee's rights run only to the commission. The
employee cannot be reinstated or, I assume, recover any damages for lost salary.
In the actual Fortune case, the court affirmed a jury verdict that the employer's
termination was in bad faith. Because Fortune only sought compensation for the lost
commission, the case is not authority for Illustration 1's conclusion that the employee has no
other rights after the termination. Other decisions support the Illustration's conclusion,
however.59 This seems inconsistent with the finding of bad faith or at least too limiting of its
effect. If the employer's conduct violated norms of "decency, fairness, and reasonableness," there
seems little reason to insulate the employer from liability for some quantum of the employee's
future salary as well, notwithstanding the at-will relationship. Put another way, good faith
performance and at-will employment are not in conflict and "coexist" under these circumstances
because the employee's "objectively reasonable expectations" are that the employer will not
terminate the employee to deprive the employee of commissions and that the employer will be
liable for expectancy damages if the employer does so.60
Illustration 1 to Section 2.07 and, for that matter, the Fortune case itself do not
sufficiently underscore additional difficult hurdles employees face in establishing a bad-faith
termination even under Section 2.07's framework. Perhaps most challenging, the employer may
point to express contract language that seemingly permits termination. How can an employee
57

"[I]t is difficult to distinguish a 'bad faith' discharge from a no-cause discharge * * *." Metcalf .v
Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1984).
58

364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).

59

See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
This conclusion satisfies the instruction set forth in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 448 (Del. 1996), quoted in text accompanying notes .
60

9

reasonably expect a commission, for example, if the contract expressly excludes one under the
circumstances? Section 3.05 of the employment Restatement, dealing with the good-faith
obligation in the context of compensation and benefits, appears to narrow employee rights in the
face of just such express contract language. Comment b to the section says “the express terms of
the agreement between the parties control." Illustration 2 to Section 3.05, building on the
Fortune case, posits that a term of the employment contract expressly states that if the employee
is not on the payroll 30 days after the customer receives the equipment without complaint the
additional 25 percent commission goes to the employee “servicing the account,” not the
terminated employee. Illustration 2 concludes that the terminated employee "has no claim"
against the employer for the commission.
Comment b to Section 3.05 and Illustration 2 seem too restrictive of employee rights. In
fact, the court in Fortune expressly stated that "[a]ccording to a literal reading of the contract,
NCR [the employer]" did not breach the contract, but it still found for the employee because of
the employer’s bad faith.61 Other courts facing just such circumstances also reason that courts
should interpret express terms with the view that the parties likely intended a fair and just
interpretation of them. For example, in Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell,62 an employer expressly
enjoyed "sole discretion" to alter sales quotas of its employees. The employer raised the sales
quotas, which deprived the employee of certain commissions. Then Judge Scalia nonetheless
stated:
[A]greeing to such a provision would require a degree of folly on the part of these sales
representatives we are not inclined to posit where another plausible interpretation of the
language is available. It seems to us that the 'sole discretion' intended was discretion to
determine the existence or nonexistence of the various factors that would reasonably
justify alteration of the sales quota. Those factors would include . . . an unanticipated
volume of business from a particular customer unconnected with the extra sales efforts of
the employee assigned to that account; and . . . a poor overall sales year for the company,
leaving less gross income to be expended on commissions. . . . But the language need not
(and therefore can not reasonably) be read to confer discretion to [increase] the quota for
any reason whatever--including . . . a simple desire to deprive an employee of the fairly
agreed benefit of his labors.63
Under the facts of Illustration 2, it would be unusual if either the employer or the sales employee
reasonably expected that the term giving 25 percent of the commission to the servicing employee
applied in situations where the employer’s sole reason for terminating the sales employee was to
deprive the sales employee of the commission. Further, such conduct, I would argue, contradicts
the community's view of fairness and decency.
61

364 N.E.2d at 101.

62

727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
727 F.2d at 1155. Some courts agree with this reasoning because it appeals to a sense of justice, and
invokes the parties' likely intentions, thereby theoretically preserving contractual freedom. Other courts
show concern that such an approach bends and stretches the notion of consent. See Robert A. Hillman,
Good Faith Performance of Contracts in Late Twentieth-Century American Law, in Prescriptive
Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, 327, 331 (1994).

63
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Employees must also show that the employer’s motivation was to deprive the employee
of its just deserts. In a way, Fortune is an unfortunate precedent in this regard, at least from the
perspective of those interested in employee rights. This is because the evidence appears almost a
slam dunk for Fortune. As the court says, "We think that the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom support a jury verdict that the termination of Fortune's twentyfive years of employment as a salesman with NCR the next business day after NCR obtained a
$5,000,000 order * * * was motivated by a desire to pay Fortune as little of the bonus credit as it
could."64 Under the facts of Fortune, therefore, the court likely felt little contrition about
interpreting the express terms of the contract to disapprove of such a termination. Employees
likely will not have such striking evidence in the typical case.
The approach in Section 2.07 raises additional difficult questions. As already mentioned,
the employment Restatement leaves open the possibility that Section 2.07(c) is not meant to
preclude other instances of bad faith termination.65 Those exceptions, if any, await common law
development, which will entail the difficult challenge of further harmonization of at-will
employment and good faith. Obviously, if examples build up, the at-will principle necessarily
will recede in importance and courts must remain aware of the importance of balancing at-will
and other principles.66
In sum, the employment Restatement's move to place good-faith performance within the
province of employment at will is a useful affirmation in the employment setting of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts' recognition of the obligation. Inevitably, as with the
employment Restatement's nod to promissory estoppel, additional clarification awaits case law
development.
D. Other Exceptions to At-Will Employment In Brief
I have chosen to focus on promissory estoppel and good faith performance as examples
of the employment Restatement's approach to accommodating at-will employment termination
and its counter-principles. Additional sections of Chapter 2 follow a similar approach. Concepts
such as mutuality of obligation67 and material breach,68 for example, are helpfully situated within
an employment contracts framework, but the drafters largely leave development of their content
to future cases.69 This is not meant as a criticism. As with promissory estoppel and good faith
performance, drafting in the shadow of contract law makes this strategy inevitable.
II. The Restatement of Employment Law Chapter 2: An Evaluation
A. What is the Purpose of the ALI Restatement of Employment Law?
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It is fair to say that the employment law Restatement and Chapter 2 were not received
favorably by some critics during and after the drafting process.70 I will discuss some of the
criticism shortly. Some of the fireworks can be attributed to the ambiguous role of ALI
Restatements. At bottom is the question of whether Restatements literally are supposed to
"restate" existing law or do they have a normative goal as well. To evaluate Chapter 2, some
clarity about the project's purpose is necessary. This part therefore briefly discusses ALI's charge
to the drafters of their Restatements.
The ALI lays out its overall goals on its website: "The American Law Institute is the
leading independent organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify,
modernize, and otherwise improve the law."71 According to the website, the work of the
restatements was originally conceptualized as an effort to clarify the law: "The founding
Committee had recommended that the first undertaking of the Institute should address
uncertainty in the law through a Restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and
lawyers what the law was. The formulation of such a Restatement thus became ALI's first
endeavor."72 Today, a Handbook for Reporters and others involved in projects describes
Restatements as "aim[ing] at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or
variations and reflect[ing] the law as it presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a
court."73 The goal of restatements therefore is to clarify the law. According to ALI's website, the
ALI intends another type of project, ALI's "Principles of the Law," to do the main normative
work: "The Institute also engages in intensive examination and analysis of legal areas thought to
need reform. This type of study generally culminates in extensive recommendations for change
in the law and usually is published as Principles of the Law."74
Strictly speaking, then, the employment law Restatement's foremost goal should be to
consider the ever-increasing, overly amorphous body of law and to boil it down into a clearer,
coherent set of rules.75 But, of course, that is easier said than done. Reporters have to pick and
70
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choose among conflicting rationales and holdings especially where there is no sense of a
"majority rule" among courts or a consensus among experts on what is the better rule.76 They
must employ standards such as good faith and reasonableness to capture the essence of some
cases, which often only raises issues as to the meaning of such standards in various contexts.77
Reporters also must restate rules they fear may be over- or under-inclusive, which, of course, is
not much of a clarification of the law at all.78 In addition, it is no secret that Restatements often
delve into what the law should be despite the demarcation between Restatements and Principles
projects.79 In fact, the Reporters Manual licenses such activity, albeit at a modest pace:
Restatements—“analytical, critical and constructive”—accordingly resemble
codifications more than mere compilations of the pronouncements of judges. * * *
Although Restatements are expected to aspire toward the precision of statutory
language, they are also intended to reflect the flexibility and capacity for development
and growth of the common law. They are therefore phrased not in the mandatory
terms of a statute but in the descriptive terms of a judge announcing the law to be
applied in a given case. A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a commonlaw court, attentive to and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is
inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a whole. * * * A significant contribution
of the Restatements has also been anticipation of the direction in which the law is
tending and expression of that development in a manner consistent with previously
established principles. Restatements are instruments for innovations of this sort.
Nevertheless, the improvements wrought by Restatements are necessarily modest and
incremental, seamless extensions of the law as it presently exists. An unelected body
like The American Law Institute has limited competence and no special authority to
make major innovations in matters of public policy. Its authority derives rather from
its competence in drafting precise and internally consistent articulations of law.80
With the hurdles to clarification mentioned in Part I of this article, and keeping in mind
the charge to ALI Reporters, I evaluate the employment Restatement in the next subsection. I
focus on the latter part of the statement in the Reporters' Manual, which appears to harmonize
ALI's somewhat conflicting descriptions of what Restatements are designed to do. In short, is
Chapter 2 of the employment Restatement a "precise and internally consistent articulation[]" of
employment termination and are the improvements suggested "modest and incremental, seamless
extensions" of present law?
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B. Does Chapter 2 Satisfy the Goals of a Restatement?
Chapter 2 of the employment Restatement satisfies the goals of a Restatement. The
Chapter is largely a helpful and accurate framework of current law with incremental normative
extensions.81 For example, the Restatement situates at-will employment and the counterprinciples without a heavy hand in either direction. Moreover, it affirms the use of promissory
estoppel notwithstanding remaining tension in the case law. Chapter 2 also suggests that
promises can be enforceable without the specificity demanded of enforceable contracts. In
addition, Chapter 2 not only recognizes the good-faith performance principle in the employment
setting, but adopts it as mandatory term despite the jurisdictions that still debunk the theory. In
addition, the Restatement helpfully identifies the two most prominent kinds of bad faith in the
cases.
Another manner of evaluating Chapter 2 is by considering some of the criticisms of the
Chapter. One complaint often heard was that the project lacked a unifying theory,82 but instead
employed a "balkanized approach."83 Doubters also suggested that contract law was not a useful
vehicle for analysis.84 Further, critics regretted the timing of the drafting of the Restatement,
worrying that it would "freeze" unsettled or developing law.85 So, should the employment
Restatement have presented a unified theory? Is contract law the appropriate conceptual
framework, notwithstanding its pluralism? Should ALI have embarked on an employment
Restatement at this time?
1. Should the employment Restatement have presented a unified theory? Some analysts
criticized the employment Restatement for lacking an underlying, unifying theory, as if such a
thing would magically explain employment (and termination) law and protect employees under
the appropriate circumstances. Indeed, Chapter 2, although denominated Employment Contracts:
Termination, does lack such a theory but, as with general contract law, there is no underlying
theory that would capture the richness of the law of termination of employment contracts.86 For
81
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example, promissory estoppel is an independent theory of obligation and in truth is closer to tort
law than contract. Good faith performance depends on fairness and justice and thus introduces
elements that are independent of assent and agreement. Because general contract law has no
overarching theory of its own it is no surprise that a treatment of employment law would not
either. By identifying the issues and situating the diverse legal principles that arise in the
termination context, the employment Restatement will be helpful to courts. This is all that an
attempt to corral the law of employment termination can hope for.
2. Is contract law the appropriate conceptual framework for employment agreements?
Notwithstanding contract law's heterogeneity, dissenters worried that it is unfit to regulate
employment arrangements: "Can a relationship really be deemed a contract at all if it's
unbreachable?"87 Technically, under contract law's mutuality-of-obligation requirement, the
critics have a point. Employment-at-will arrangements are illusory if the parties have no
obligation to each other. But employers may have an obligation to give notice of termination.88
In addition, if an employee has supplied consideration to support an employer's promise of justcause employment or employment of a certain duration, such as by leaving another job at the
request of the employer, contract law enforces the employer's promise.89 These examples meet
all of the requisites of an enforceable contract.90
More important, to deny employment termination the contract imprimatur would only
impoverish the analysis. In its broadest conception, a contract is "a promise or set of promises for
the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law recognizes as a
duty."91 Of course, such a definition does not tell us very much because it only leads to the
question of when is a promise enforceable.92 But by calling employment termination a contract
problem in Chapter 2, the employment Restatement thereby invokes the whole body of precedent
establishing what promises are enforceable and why. Such an inquiry encompasses agreements
supported by consideration, detrimental reliance on a promise, quasi contracts and more and, as
shown, applies to the mutuality problem discussed above. If contract were replaced as an
analytical tool, the existing framework for examining theories such as promissory estoppel and
good faith performance would also be lost at little or no gain.
3. Should ALI have embarked on an employment Restatement at this time? The law and
the society it governs do not stand still, and I doubt that there is ever an optimal time to restate
the law. This is especially true of employment termination law because of the dynamic nature of
labor markets and because of the effect of new technologies on the nature of business activities.
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Still, a plausible argument can be made that the common law has not moved very much on
employment at will and its counter-principles in the last 20 years or so.93 Whatever the trend, the
employment Restatement performs a useful service now by identifying issues and presenting a
framework for future development. In addition, because employment termination relies on broad
principles such as reasonableness and good faith, it can hardly "freeze" the law. Perhaps a helpful
analogy to the Restatement’s role is the use by lawyers of preliminary agreements that
memorialize terms in negotiation and form the outline for future agreements.94 The employment
Restatement and preliminary agreements share a common goal of seeking to organize and
simplify an ongoing project once an abundant amount of data has been amassed.
Further, future development of the common law of employment termination is hard to
predict. Are courts going to whittle away at at-will employment or, on the other hand, narrow
counter-principles? So those in favor of greater employee or employer rights cannot confidently
prefer the common law to what the employment Restatement has to offer.95
III. What if the project had been "Principles of Employment Law?"
In this part, I ponder the following question: Suppose the ALI project on employment
termination in Chapter 2 had been part of a "Principles" project instead of a restatement. What
might “Employment Termination Principles” look like? I should disclose that my own work for
the ALI as reporter of Principles of the Law of Software Contracts freed me from the restraints
of a restatement and allowed me to ponder more directly what the law should be. As I wrote in
the introduction to the Principles, "[i]nstead of restating the law, a “Principles” project accounts
for the case law and recommends best practices, without unduly hindering the law’s adaptability
to future developments."96 Because the nature of a restatement is different from a principles
project, however, I do not mean to suggest that the drafters of the employment Restatement
necessarily should have adopted any of the following suggestions. Nor do I want to suggest that
the following "Principles" are anything more than my own view of the path that employment
termination should take. (I must admit it is a luxury to make suggestion without having to
balance the rather adamant views of opposing interests.) But I would argue that the following
suggestions, although mainly bolstering employee protections, also preserve the important role
of employment at will. My focus is again on Chapter 2's use of promissory estoppel and good
faith performance as counter-principles to the default rule of at-will employment.
As part of a "Principles" project, the Reporters could have elaborated on how promissory
estoppel should operate in the context of at-will employment. As I described in Part I, crucial
are whether the employer made a promise and whether the employee should have reasonably
relied on the promise.97 For purposes of evaluating whether a communication constituted a
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promise, contract law’s rules of interpretation should apply. First, courts should examine the
words of the communication to see whether under their dictionary meaning they constitute an
assurance as to future job security. Looking at the plain meaning of language such as "your job
is secure,"98 "there is no need * * * to look elsewhere,"99 "[you] will continue to have a career
with [us] until age sixty-five,"100 and [you will] remain employed by the company,"101 it is
difficult to see how these communications can be anything other than "an assurance" of a secure
future with the employer. The absence of more detail, such as a specific duration, should not
matter when examining the dictionary meaning. As already noted, Comment c of the
employment Restatement appears to make this point: "Where the conditions for promissory
estoppel are present, promises may be enforceable even though an agreement itself would not be
enforceable for lack of a written document." The language of the Comment would have been
more clear and capture more cases, however, if it read that a promise may be enforceable
although not definite enough to be an enforceable contract.102 For that matter, Section 2.02(b) in
a Principles project could have invoked a broader conception of estoppel, for example, to include
conduct that induces reasonable reliance.103
Next, a Principles project could focus on the circumstances in which the employer made
the assurance, including the presence of an express or default rule of at-will employment. As
with general contract law's use of trade custom, course of dealing, and course of performance to
fill out the reasonable meaning of agreements, employment termination principles could look to
these sources of meaning to supplement the plain meaning of a communication and to determine
whether the employee's reliance was reasonable. As for the latter, if an employer tells an
employee that "your job is secure" and employees regularly rely on such a statement in the
particular trade that should be strong evidence that the employee's reliance was reasonable.104
Similarly, if the employer has made such statements in the context of previous employment
relationships and the employee relied on them, this course of dealing suggests the employee is
reasonable to rely once again.105 Finally, if the issue involves a cluster of positive
communications from the employer, this course of performance would be relevant in
determining the reasonableness of reliance.106
In assessing the reasonableness of an employee's reliance, a Principles project could also
devote more attention to the often uneven relationship between employer and employee. To
review, many employees have invested their time, money, and psyche in their job. Further, they
may have few or no alternatives and believe the employer will look out for their welfare. These
employees lack the wherewithal to withstand employer inducements designed to create a loyal
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work force.107 Contract law evaluates the reasonableness of a party's actions by taking into
account the attributes and circumstances of the relying actor.108 To determine whether an
employee reasonably relied on the employer's inducements, therefore, a court should ask what a
reasonable party in the shoes of the employee would have done.
A Principles project on employment termination could also reject cases that dismiss an
employee's reasonable reliance when it consists of failing to enter the job market. If the evidence
reveals that the employee could have secured other work but was induced not to test the market
and the evidence proves with sufficient certainty what the employee's new salary would have
been there is little reason to bar such evidence or reject that theory of recovery. In fact, under the
avoidable consequences rule, courts use such evidence against employees to diminish their
damages for wrongful termination if the employee does not accept reasonable alternative
employment.109
As for the good-faith obligation, a Principles project on employment termination could
follow the lead of then Judge Scalia in the Tymshare case and clarify that courts should not allow
express language to trump the good-faith obligation.110 Instead, courts should interpret express
terms in light of the likelihood that the parties intended performance to be fair and reasonable.
A Principles project also could be more attentive to how courts determine the motives of
an employer who fires an employee. The test should be objective as in general contract law:
based on the circumstances, what would a reasonable person believe was the employer's motive?
And the project could enumerate additional examples of possible bad faith motives. Such
motives may include personal animosity toward a highly functioning employee or retaliation for
the employee's reasonable conduct outside of employment.111 Firing an employee for such
reasons belies the employee's reasonable expectations or the community's view of fairness even
in an at-will employment arrangement. In addition, an employer who justifies termination by
fictionalizing the grounds for dissatisfaction with the employee's performance is in bad faith
because an employee or the community would not reasonably expect such conduct even in an atwill contract.112
For the reasons already discussed, a Principles project could establish that an employer
who terminates an employee in bad faith to deprive the employee of commissions should be
liable for the employee's commissions, but also expectancy damages notwithstanding the at-will
relationship.113 This result, although likely contrary to the prevailing view,114 improves the law
by creating an additional employer incentive not to terminate in bad faith.
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Finally, ambitious drafters of a Principles project could account for today's reality of
employees increasingly at risk of termination and facing frequent job searches. According to one
analyst, "[w]hat we need going forward is a contract theory of worker protection that focuses on
enabling continued labor market participation rather than preserving particular jobs."115 One
approach to this problem in a Principles project would be to declare that good-faith performance
requires meaningful notice before termination and severance pay if notice is not feasible because
of unforeseen conditions.116 Perhaps this is not too much of a stretch under the reasonable
expectations or community standards approaches of good-faith performance. But such an
approach obviously raises significant issues, including whether such protection makes economic
sense and, if so, how to implement the strategy. As to the former issue, the benefits of protecting
employees may be greatly outweighed by the costs to employers of creating an obligation in the
context of negative business circumstances. As to the latter, questions arise such as when must
notice be given and how should severance pay be calculated? Relatedly, would employers pass
on the costs of such a program to employees in the form of reduced wages?117 Perhaps any such
strategy in favor of employees terminated in poor economic times would best be handled in a
statute that lawmakers could model after existing efforts.118
Conclusion
Contract law is useful and succeeds in guiding exchange transaction largely because it is
multidimensional and practical.119 It lacks a dominant vision, but instead embraces disorder and
contradiction. This is a good thing because no single theory could encompass the entire set of
social and economic forces that are implicated in exchange agreements.120
Chapter 2 of the employment Restatement on termination embodies a subset of contract
law issues, so it should be no surprise that the Chapter reflects contract law's heterogeneity. So
the problem of sorting out lawful terminations of employees from wrongful ones cannot be
resolved, it can only be tempered by establishing a framework for analysis. Based on an analysis
of Chapter 2's treatment of at-will, promissory estoppel, and the obligation of good faith, and
based on the role of an ALI restatement, the employment Restatement largely meets this
challenge.
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